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The majority of federal environmental statutes' criminalize
certain conduct by persons2 within the regulated community.
In particular, most of these statutes target for criminal liability
certain conduct that is engaged in "knowingly." ' In light of
repeated promises by the United States' Environmental Pro-
tection Agency and Department of Justice Land and Natural
Resources Division to increase prosecution of environmental
crimes,4 individuals and corporations within the regulated
community must examine what it means to have "knowingly"
acted for purposes of potential criminal liability under federal
t B.A., cum laude, Trinity University, 1984; J.D., University of Texas, 1987.
Karen Hansen is an attorney currently working in the environmental law section at
Popham, Haik, Schnobrich & Kaufman, Ltd. in Minneapolis, Minnesota.
1. This article focuses on criminal provisions in federal environmental statutes.
Almost every state has in some form criminalized certain conduct relating to state
environmental regulation. For a thorough discussion of state environmental crimes,
see DeCicco & Bonanno, A Comparative Analysis of the Criminal Environmental Laws of the
Fifty States: The Need for Statutory Uniformity as a Catalyst for Effective Enforcement of Existing
and Proposed Laws, 5J. LAND USE & ESVTL. L. 1 (1989).
2. For purposes of this article, persons regulated under the federal environ-
mental statutes are assumed to include both corporations and individuals.
3. See, e.g., Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C.
§ 1361(b) (1988); Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2614, 2615(b) (1988);
Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c) (Supp. V 1987); Solid
Waste Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d) (Supp. V 1987) (commonly referred to as
the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act or RCRA); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 7413(c) (1982); Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Li-
ability Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. § 9603 (1982 & Supp. V 1987) (commonly referred to
as "Superfund"); Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986,
42 U.S.C. § 11045(b)(4) (Supp. V 1987). Other state of mind requirements appear in
separate provisions of the Clean Water Act and in RCRA. Under the Clean Water
Act, negligent violations of certain provisions are misdemeanors on a first conviction
and felonies thereafter. See 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(1) (Supp. V 1987). Both the Clean
Water Act and RCRA establish "knowing endangerment" provisions, the violation of
which subjects a person to heightened criminal sanctions. See 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(3)
(Supp. V 1987); 42 U.S.C. § 6928(e) (Supp. V 1987). See also Volz & Gray, Knowing
Endangerment: The New Darling of the Environmental Prosecutors, CHEM. WASTE LrriG.
REP., June 1988, at 39.
4. See, e.g., Criminal Prosecutions, State Cooperation Seen as Key Enforcement Priorities in
1990, [Current Developments] ENV'T REP. (BNA) No. 40, 1714-16 (Feb. 2, 1990).
1
Hansen: "Knowing" Environmental Crimes
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1990
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
environmental statutes.5
Because of certain judicial principles formulated in criminal
jurisprudence and because of caselaw trends in the regulatory
crimes area, individuals and corporations could conceivably
face criminal prosecution under environmental laws for con-
duct that is, at worst, negligent. This article illustrates that
rote application of these principles under environmental stat-
utes could lead to criminal prosecution for conduct that is and
should remain uniquely subject to civil enforcement.
Part I of this article sets forth traditional substantive law on
the scope of the "knowing" state of mind. Part I also focuses
on the "willful blindness" and "collective knowledge" princi-
ples, developed in criminal jurisprudence, that dilute a statu-
tory "knowledge" requirement. Part II then outlines trends in
regulatory crimes caselaw. Specifically, part II discusses the
"responsible relationship" and "public welfare offense" doc-
trines in the context of "knowing" offenses. Whether or not
all public welfare statutes contain "public welfare offenses" is
also addressed. The discussion in part III critiques recent
cases that have misused these developments to abrogate the
"knowing" element present in. most federal environmental
statutes. Part IV demonstrates there is a real risk of criminaliz-
ing conduct-by individuals and corporations-that is merely
negligent, or that traditionally has been the basis of civil en-
forcement on a strict liability basis. In particular, part IV dis-
cusses the legal precedents applicable to an analysis of
"knowing" environmental offenses and argues in support of
cautious application of certain criminal law principles in judi-
cial analysis of environmental crime cases.
I. THE SCOPE OF A "KNOWING" STATE OF MIND
As indicated previously, most criminal provisions in the fed-
eral environmental statutes require a person to have done
something "knowingly" before criminal liability will attach.6
5. This article addresses the state of mind aspect of "knowing" conduct under
environmental statutes. For a thoughtful analysis of when a state of mind require-
ment should apply to particular elements of an environmental crime, see Comment,
Element Analysis Applied to Environmental Crimes: What Did They Know and When Did They
Know It?, 16 B.C. ENV-rL. AFF. J. 53 (1988) (arguing that, consistent with the Model
Penal Code, courts should determine liability for environmental crimes only after a
careful application of culpability principles to each element of an offense).
6. See supra note 3.
[Vol. 16
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The consistent use by Congress in these statutes of a seem-
ingly straightforward word-"knowingly"-would logically
lead one to believe Congress contemplated a particular mental
state be present in order to trigger criminal liability. With one
exception,7 however, Congress apparently left to the courts the
task of defining the requisite mental state embodied in the
term "knowingly.""
A. Traditional View of a "Knowing" Culpability Requirement
Judicial construction of the "knowing" mental state has
highlighted the ambiguity of that term9 and has resulted in that
term including a range of mental states.' 0 The modem view,
reflected in the Model Penal Code, is that "one 'knows' of
present... events only if he is actually aware of them."" The
word "knowingly" thus denotes crimes that require actual
awareness of the nature of the act or omission, the results that
will follow from an act or omission, or the circumstances indi-
cating an act or omission.'
2
. Under the Model Penal Code, crimes requiring a knowing
mental state are distinguished from (1) crimes requiring an in-
7. Congress set forth standards concerning the "knowing" requirement for pur-
poses of RCRA's "knowing endangerment" provision. See 42 U.S.C. § 6928(e)
(Supp. V 1987). Knowing endangerment is defined as "[a]ny person.., who knows
at the time that he thereby places another person in imminent danger of death or
serious bodily injury .... " Id.
8. Under RCRA's criminal provision, for example, Congress indicated it had
"not sought to define 'knowing' for offenses under [42 U.S.C. § 6928(d) (Supp. V
1987) (RCRA § 3008)] subsection (d); that process has been left to the courts under
general principles." S. REP. No. 172, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 39, reprinted in 1980 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5038.
9. Much of the difficulty involved in ascertaining what, if any, state of mind
is required for a particular crime lies in the ambiguous meaning of the par-
ticular word or phrase used. Even "knowingly" is not entirely clear; for in-
stance, does one know a fact (e.g., that property is stolen) when he is 95%
sure of it but not completely certain?
1 W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTr, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAw § 3.4(b), at 299 (1986).
10. The range of mental states is described as:
Cases have held that one has knowledge of a given fact when he has the
means for obtaining such knowledge, when he has notice of facts which
would put one on inquiry as to the existence of that fact, when he has infor-
mation sufficient to generate a reasonable belief as to that fact, or when the
circumstances are such that a reasonable man would believe that such a fact
existed.... [Thus,] the word "knowledge" has been taken to mean many
different things ....
Id. § 3.5(b), at 308-09 (footnotes omitted).
11. Id. See also MODEL PENAL CODE § 2,02(2)(b) (1985).
12. W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr, supra note 9, § 3.5(b), at 307.
1990]
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tention or purpose to do a prohibited act, cause a prohibited
result, or fail to perform a required act;"3 (2) crimes requiring
recklessness in performing an act, in failing to perform an act,
or in causing a prohibited result; 4 and (3) crimes based on
negligence in acting, failing to act, or causing a result.' 5
Thus, a "knowing" state of mind is a conscious one, but not
necessarily a purposeful one. Because it requires conscious-
ness of facts or circumstances, the term "knowingly" likewise
denotes more than mere negligence or even recklessness.
B. The Willful Blindness or Deliberate Ignorance Doctrine
The requirement of actual awareness of a fact that is material
to an element of an offense is critical to a finding of knowledge
under a "knowing" culpability requirement. An important ex-
ception to the actual awareness requirement has developed in
modern criminal jurisprudence. Known as "willful blindness"
or "deliberate ignorance,"' 6 the exception exists "'where it
can almost be said that the defendant actually knew'" a fact or
circumstance that constitutes an element of an offense.' 7 An
example is "when a person 'has his suspicion aroused but then
deliberately omits to make further inquiries, because he wishes to
remain in ignorance.' "18
Although the drafters of the Model Penal Code highlighted
the fact that such conduct probably falls somewhere between
knowledge and recklessness,' 9 the Ninth Circuit in United States
v. Jewell classified this type of conduct as "knowledge," on the
basis that "deliberate ignorance and positive knowledge are
13. Id. § 3.4(c), at 300.
14. A "reckless" mental state reflects a "subjective fault in that the actor must in
his own mind realize the risk which his conduct involves." Id.
15. A "negligent" mental state involves "objective fault in creating an unreason-
able risk." Id. As to which elements of an offense a given culpability requirement
applies, the Model Penal Code's position is that a mental state expressed by statute
applies to all material elements of a crime "unless a contrary purpose plainly appears
in the statute." Id. (citing MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(4)). See Comment, supra note 5,
at 58.
16. "Deliberate ignorance" is sometimes referred to as "deliberate avoidance."
See, e.g., United States v. Pacific Hide & Fur Depot, Inc., 768 F.2d 1096 (9th Cir.
1985).
17. W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTr, supra note 9, § 3.5(b), at 307 (quoting G. WILLIAMS,
CRIMINAL LAw: THE GENERAL PART § 57, at 157-59 (2d ed. 1961)) (emphasis added).
18. Id. (emphasis added).
19. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 comment 3 (1985).
(Vol. 16
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equally culpable."2 Building on the notion that deliberate ig-
norance and knowledge are congruent states of mind, a typical
jury instruction on willful blindness provides that: "The ele-
ment of knowledge may be satisfied by inferences drawn from
proof that a defendant deliberately closed his eyes to what
would otherwise have been obvious to him" and that "a de-
fendant's knowledge of a fact may be inferred from willful
blindness to the existence of the fact."' 21 Thus, if a defendant's
knowledge or actual awareness of a fact or circumstance is less
than one hundred percent, his purposeful failure to expand his
knowledge to one hundred percent can subject him to criminal
liability.
In application, courts have not paid heed to the limitation
stated in early articulations of this principle; namely, that the
purpose behind deliberately remaining ignorant must be to
provide a defense to later liability or to "avoid learning the
truth for fear of learning that contemplated action [or inaction]
would be unlawful."' 22 Instead, consistent with the Model Pe-
nal Code,23 if a defendant is aware of facts or circumstances
indicating a "high probability" of illegality, but fails to investi-
gate, the courts will infer the defendant's "knowledge" of the
facts or circumstances constituting an element of the offense.24
20. 532 F.2d 697, 700 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 951 (1976).
21. 1 E. DEvrcr & C. BLAcKMAR, FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS
§ 14.09 (3d ed. 1977).
22. Perkins, "Knowledge" as a Mens Rea Requirement, 29 HASTINGS L.J. 953, 964
(1978). The author suggests that the common law concepts of knowledge are much
more inclusive than the Model Penal Code's definition of "knowledge." The Model
Penal Code's incomplete coverage of knowledge warrants that states drafting their
own penal codes depart from the Model Penal Code in the knowledge section and
incorporate a more expansive concept. Those states that already have penal codes
should amend their codes accordingly.
23. Model Penal Code section 2.02(7) states that if "knowledge of the existence
of a particular fact is an element of an offense, such knowledge is established if a
person is aware of a high probability of its existence, unless he actually believes that it
does not exist." MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(7). This articulation appears to allow the
prosecution the benefit of an inference to prove its beyond-a-reasonable-doubt case,
once the government shows a high probability of the existence of a critical fact, i.e., a
fact that is an element of an offense. The government presumably can show this high
probability by proving the existence of, and defendant's awareness of, facts that do
not constitute elements of an offense.
24. See United States v. Jewell, 532 F.2d 697, 700 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S.
951 (1976); see also United States v. Peddle, 821 F.2d 1521, 1524-25 (11 th Cir. 1987);
United States v. Ramsey, 785 F.2d 184, 189 (7th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. McCreary v.
United States, 476 U.S. 1186 (1986); United States v. Gold, 743 F.2d 800, 818 (1 1th
Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1217 (1985).
1990]
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In recognition that the deliberate ignorance principle dilutes
the prosecution's burden in a criminal prosecution, some
members of the judiciary and some commentators have coun-
seled that courts make sparing use of the doctrine. Dissenting
in United States v. Jewell, Justice Kennedy25 (then Judge Ken-
nedy) criticized the majority for upholding an instruction at
trial on willful blindness. Justice Kennedy concluded that a de-
fendant's reckless disregard of or suspicion regarding facts or
circumstances, followed by a failure to make inquiry, simply
did not constitute the requisite culpability when the statute in
question based criminal liability on knowledge. 26 The Jewell
dissent also noted that, if a willful blindness instruction does
not allow a defendant to exonerate himself by showing he actu-
ally believed the critical fact did not exist, then a defendant can
be convicted on an objective theory of knowledge.
Others have criticized the doctrine because the "awareness
of a high probability" test presupposes that a defendant has
recognized a need to investigate. The problem with the willful
blindness doctrine, therefore, is that it focuses on culpability
for being (or remaining) ignorant of a critical fact, rather than
on proof that a defendant was aware of a need to investigate to
ascertain that fact:
Whenever the need to investigate is recognized, culpability is
established by a conscious effort to avoid learning the truth
for fear of learning that contemplated action would be un-
lawful. But without awareness of facts indicating a high
probability of unlawfulness, the need to investigate may be
overlooked. And there is no conscious purpose to avoid learning
the truth when the risk of unlawfulness has not been realized. In
other words, without either other evidence or awareness of
facts indicating a high probability of unlawfulness, there is
no basis for an inference that the need to investigate had
been recognized, and there could be no wilful avoidance
without such recognition.
28
This critique seems valid and, if accepted by a court, would
require the prosecution to show a defendant's awareness not
25. At the time of theJewell decision,Justice Kennedy was a judge in the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
26. Jewell, 532 F.2d at 707 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
27. "[For example, inJewell... 'a reasonable man should have inspected the car
and would have discovered what was hidden inside.'" W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTr, supra
note 9, § 3.5(b), at 308 (quotingJewell, 532 F.2d at 707 (Kennedy, J., dissenting)).
28. Perkins, supra note 22, at 964 (emphasis added).
[Vol. 16
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only of a high probability of the existence of a critical fact, but
also the defendant's awareness of a high probability that an
investigation to determine the existence of that fact was legally
required.
In United States v. Pacific Hide & Fur Depot, Inc. ,2§ the Ninth
Circuit, led by Justice (then Judge) Kennedy, addressed the
scope of the deliberate ignorance doctrine in the context of an
environmental crime. The court reversed the trial court's con-
viction of a corporation and individual defendants for im-
proper disposal of PCB-containing capacitors on the basis of
the improper application of the deliberate ignorance jury in-
struction. 0 Under the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA),
in order to obtain a criminal conviction; the government must
prove a knowing or willful violation of regulations issued
under the statute.3 1 The regulations at issue prohibited the
disposal of capacitors containing PCBs; thus, the Ninth Circuit
reasoned that, if the defendants did not know the capacitors
contained PCBs, there could be no criminal violation. 2
In Pacific Hide, the trial court had allowed the government's
case to go to the jury with the deliberate ignorance instruction.
The Ninth Circuit indicated that the use of this instruction was
proper "only when [the] defendant claims a lack of guilty
knowledge and the proof at trial supports an inference of de-
liberate ignorance. 3 3 Consequently, it was not enough that
the defendant was mistaken, recklessly disregarded the truth,
or negligently failed to inquire as to the content of the capaci-
tors. "Instead, the government must present evidence indicat-
ing that [the] defendant purposely contrived to avoid learning
all of the facts in order to have a defense in the event of subse-
quent prosecution. Absent such evidence, the jury might im-
permissibly infer guilty knowledge on the basis of mere
negligence without proof of deliberate avoidance."'34 Given
the statutory mental state requirement of "knowing or willful,"
the Ninth Circuit concluded that such an inference, based on
the deliberate ignorance instruction, was improper.
3 5
29. 768 F.2d 1096 (9th Cir. 1985).
30. Id. at 1098-99.
31. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2614, 2615(b) (1988).
32. Pacific Hide, 768 F.2d at 1098.
33. Id.
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The Ninth Circuit found that the government's evidence in
Pacific Hide was insufficient to warrant an instruction for delib-
erate ignorance. In particular, the court found: (1) there was
no evidence that the defendants had deliberately avoided
learning the true nature of the fluid in the capacitors for the
purpose of building a defense to a subsequent prosecution; (2)
there was no evidence that the employees who actually dis-
posed of the capacitors were warned by the corporate head-
quarters that the capacitors might contain PCBs (no awareness
of a high probability that a material fact existed); and (3) there
was no evidence that the defendants knew what capacitors
were or what they contained (no awareness of a high
probability that a material fact existed)., 6 In addition, the fact
that the defendants left capacitors with leaks in open view,
even though experts, and indeed EPA investigators that had
been on-site, would recognize these items as leaking PCB
fluids, indicated to the court a lack of awareness by the defend-
ants that PCB-leaking capacitors violated any law, including
TSCA regulations (no awareness of a duty to inquire)., 7 The
Ninth Circuit also found that the government's evidence indi-
cating that the corporation had instructed its employees to
bury the capacitors was not enough to show guilty knowledge.
If anything, the Ninth Circuit held, this pointed to actual
knowledge rather than deliberate ignorance. Finally, the court
found that it was not enough that the defendants knew PCBs
could be or were present in transformer fluid, since this fluid
was physically dissimilar to that contained in capacitors, and
therefore was inconclusive as to defendants' knowledge n.3
The Pacific Hide case illustrates the impropriety of using a
deliberate ignorance instruction where a statute requires a
"knowing" violation if the facts and circumstances are such
that the defendant's mental state is merely one of mistake,
reckless (versus knowing) disregard of the truth, or negligent
(versus knowing) failure to inquire. The Ninth Circuit's rea-
soning also puts meaning back into the limitation on the de-
fendant's purposes in remaining deliberately ignorant; namely,
that the defendant purposefully avoided learning all of the
facts because he wanted to maintain the ability to subsequently
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deny knowledge in a prosecution. The opinion also supports
the notion that, for a deliberate ignorance instruction to be ap-
propriate, there must be proof that a defendant had an aware-
ness of a high probability of a need to investigate. In the Pacific
Hide case, the government's evidence did not indicate that the
defendants were aware of a high probability of being legally
obligated to investigate whether or not the capacitors con-
tained PCBs. 9
C. The "Collective Knowledge" Doctrine
As the deliberate ignorance doctrine erodes the requisite
awareness an individual must possess to be subject to criminal
liability, the "collective knowledge" doctrine similarly dilutes
the requisite "knowledge" a corporation must possess to be
found criminally liable. Under this doctrine, the collective
knowledge of a corporation's employees can be imputed to the
corporation to show the requisite mental state.40 Thus, "a cor-
poration may be held liable for knowing violations of the law
notwithstanding the absence of proof that any single agent [or
employee] intended to commit the offense or even knew of the
existence of the operative facts that led to the violation." '4'
A case often cited as illustrating the operation of the collec-
tive knowledge doctrine is United States v. TLM.E.-D.C., Inc.42
In this case, a corporation was convicted of violating a Federal
Highway Administration (FHA) regulation that prohibited mo-
tor carriers from allowing or requiring drivers to operate vehi-
cles if their ability or alertness was impaired. To combat
absenteeism, the company instituted a policy requiring a physi-
cian's written confirmation of illness before the absence would
be considered excused. The company failed to give its em-
ployees notice of the new policy's existence and terms. Two
separate drivers called two separate dispatchers to report ill-
ness; both drivers ultimately reported to work to avoid having
unexcused absences.43 Criminal prosecution for violating the
FHA regulation followed the filing of a union grievance re-
garding the company's unexcused absence policy.44
39. Id.
40. K. BRICKEY, CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY § 4:05, at 93-94 (1984).
41. Id. (emphasis added).
42. 381 F. Supp. 730 (W.D. Va. 1974).
43. Id. at 733-35.
44. Id. at 733.
1990]
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The court rejected the company's argument that, because it
had no actual knowledge the drivers were ill, it had not "know-
ingly" violated the regulation. Instead, the court held that the
company knew the new policy would likely encourage truck
drivers to report for work despite illness and was, therefore,
chargeable with the knowledge that ill drivers had in fact re-
ported for work.4 5 Thus, the corporation's conviction was
based on knowledge acquired by various employees in the
scope of their employment, notwithstanding that facts critical
to establishing the offense were known to separate employees
rather than a single employee and "were never brought in ag-
gregate form to the attention of someone who would fully
comprehend their significance.' '46
A more recent application of the collective knowledge doc-
trine is found in United States v. Bank of New England, N.A. ,4 in
which a bank was convicted for reporting violations under the
Currency Transaction Reporting Act. The conviction was
based on the theory that "the bank's knowledge [was] the total-
ity of what all of the employees [knew] within the scope of their
employment."4 The First Circuit explained the rationale be-
hind the collective knowledge doctrine as follows:
A collective knowledge instruction is entirely appropriate
in the context of corporate criminal liability. The acts of a
corporation are, after all, simply the acts of all of its employ-
ees operating within the scope of their employment. The
law on corporate criminal liability reflects this [conclusion].
Similarly, the knowledge obtained by corporate employees
acting within the scope of their employment is imputed to
the corporation [under well-established legal principles].
Corporations compartmentalize knowledge, subdividing the
elements of specific duties and operations into smaller com-
ponents. The aggregate of [these] components constitutes
the corporation's knowledge of a particular operation.49
Thus, a corporation's requisite mental state can be satisfied
45. Id. at 739.
46. K. BRICKEY, supra note 40, § 4:05, at 96-97 (emphasis deleted from original)
(citing T.IM.E., 381 F. Supp. at 738).
47. 821 F.2d 844 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 328 (1987); see also United
States v. Shortt Accountancy Corp., 785 F.2d 1448 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 478 U.S.
1007 (1986) (firm held liable even though particular employee who subscribed false
tax returns was not aware of fraudulent scheme).
48. Bank of New England, 821 F.2d at 855 (quoting trial court's jury instruction).
49. Id. at 856 (citations omitted).
[Vol. 16
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even though no single employee or agent has knowledge of all
the facts necessary to establish elements of the offense, i.e.,
even though no individual employee or agent could ever be
found to have the requisite knowledge to themselves be con-
victed of the offense.50
Courts applying this doctrine either have not addressed or
have found irrelevant the fact that there may be no logical or
organizational reason why persons in "compartmentalized"
subdivisions of a corporation would communicate their knowl-
edge of pertinent facts to one another, or indeed, to a single
person within the corporation who has ultimate responsibility
for preventing the offense at issue. There is simply no require-
ment under the collective knowledge doctrine that each com-
ponent of the requisite knowledge (i.e., each employee's
knowledge of a fact necessary to showing an element of the
offense) ever come to the attention of a single person or be
collected in a common repository of information within the
organization.
II. TRENDS IN THE REGULATORY CRIMES CASELAW
As previously discussed, a corporation can be convicted of
an offense even where no single employee or agent "knows"
all of the facts resulting in a crime. Individual officers of a cor-
poration are also at risk of criminal liability if they stand in a
responsible relationship to others whose conduct has violated
a regulation or law, and the officers have failed to prevent the
violative conduct. As part A below discusses, this "responsible
corporate officer" doctrine arose in the context of criminal
prosecutions under the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act
(FDCA), which does not specify a requisite mental state in its
criminal provisions.5' Environmental statutes specifying a
"knowing" mental state are thus immediately distinguish-
able.52 Nevertheless, the fact that this doctrine emerged in the
context of a "public welfare" statute 53 provides a possible in-
50. K. BRICKEY, supra note 40, § 4:05, at 97.
51. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 331-334 (1988).
52. See infra part IV of this article.
53. See Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 254 (1952).
Congestion of cities and crowding of quarters called for health and welfare
regulations undreamed of in simpler times. Wide distribution of goods be-
came an instrument of wide distribution of harm when those who dispersed
food, drink, drugs, and even securities did not comply with reasonable stan-
dards of quality, integrity, disclosure and care. Such dangers have engen-
1990]
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road of the doctrine to environmental crime prosecutions,
even though "public welfare offenses" to which the responsi-
ble corporate officer doctrine applies are defined as those
which "'depend on no mental element but consist only of for-
bidden acts or omissions.' "' Part B below discusses the ap-
plicability of a "public welfare offense" analysis where a crime
depends on "knowing" conduct.
A. Public Welfare Offenses and the Responsible Corporate
Officer Doctrine
One of the early cases recognizing a public welfare offense
defined such offenses in terms of strict liability, with the fur-
ther elaboration that such offenses "are not in the nature of
positive aggressions or invasions, with which the common law
so often dealt, but are in the nature of neglect where the law
requires care, or inaction where it imposes a duty."'5 5 These
strict liability offenses are based on the individual corporate
officer's responsible relationship to, and presumed power and
authority to prevent, the violative conduct of another: "The ac-
cused, if he does not will the violation, usually is in a position
to prevent it with no more care than society might reasonably
expect and no more exertion than it might reasonably exact
from one who assumed his responsibilities. 5 6
Subsequent applications of the responsible corporate officer
and public welfare offense doctrines have recognized that their
use by a court depends, in most cases, on the existence of a
statute that dispenses with a requisite mental state. In United
States v. Dotterweich,57 the United States Supreme Court re-
jected the defendant's argument that he had no awareness of
wrongdoing by finding that the statute in question, the Food,
Drug and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), did not require any such
awareness or knowledge. The Court concluded that Congress,
"[i]n the interest of the larger good," had placed "the burden
of acting at hazard upon a person otherwise innocent but standing
dered increasingly numerous and detailed regulations which heighten the
duties of those in control of particular industries, trades, properties or activ-
ities that affect public health, safety or welfare.
Id.
54. Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 432 (1985) (quoting Morissette v.
United States, 342 U.S. 246, 252-53 (1952)).
55. Morissette, 342 U.S. at 255.
56. Id. at 256.
57. 320 U.S. 277 (1943).
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in a responsible relation to the public danger.""8
The Court reasoned that, by omitting an awareness-of-
wrongdoing requirement from the criminal sanction provi-
sions of the FDCA, Congress intended that "all who... have a
responsible share in the furtherance of the transaction which
the statute outlaws" could be criminally liable.5 9 While recog-
nizing the harshness of this result where a defendant's "con-
sciousness of wrongdoing [is] totally wanting," the Court
concluded that Congress had:
Balanc[ed] relative hardships .... [and] preferred to place
[the hardship] upon those who have at least the opportunity
of informing themselves of the existence of conditions im-
posed for the protection of consumers before sharing in il-
licit commerce [marketing adulterated drugs], rather than
to throw the hazard on the innocent public who are wholly
helpless.'
The precision of the Court's holding in Dotterweich and its
reasoning should not be overlooked: Because Congress wrote
the criminal sanction provisions of the FDCA to impose essen-
tially strict liability for certain violations, a defendant's defense
of unawareness of wrongdoing was simply legally irrelevant.
Although such a defendant presented a sympathetic case, the
Court determined that Congress had rejected a defendant's abil-
ity to assert an unawareness defense by drafting the FDCA to
have a pro-consumer stance in all cases.
In a subsequent FDCA prosecution, the Supreme Court fur-
ther delineated the core concept of Dotterweich: Under a statute
that dispenses with a culpability or awareness-of-wrongdoing
requirement, individual corporate officers in a responsible re-
lationship to the offense committed could be held criminally
liable even absent direct involvement in commission of the of-
fense.6' In United States v. Park, the Supreme Court recognized
that the concept of a "responsible relationship" was not com-
pletely without "some measure of blameworthiness." 62 Never-
theless, if "the defendant had, by reason of his position in the
corporation, responsibility and authority either to prevent in
the first instance, or promptly to correct, the violation com-
58. Id. at 281 (emphasis added).
59. Id. at 284.
60. Id. at 284-85.
61. See United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658 (1975).
62. Id. at 673.
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plained of, and ... failed to do so," criminal liability under the
FDCA was appropriate.63
The "prevent or correct" concept embraced by the Park
Court embodies two considerations. First, it is a recognition of
an officer's ultimate organizational responsibility for or author-
ity over activities (or omissions) of subordinates who are in a
position to directly violate the FDCA's prohibitions.' Second,
it relies on a reading of the FDCA as imposing affirmative du-
ties on the responsible corporate officer which the officer, be-
cause of his position, should be aware of, but which he in fact
fails to adequately carry OUt. 6 5 In this regard, the Court in Park
found that the FDCA "imposes not only a positive duty to seek
out and remedy violations when they occur but also, and pri-
marily, a duty to implement measures that will insure that vio-
lations will not occur."'6 6  In other words, responsible
corporate officials are required under the FDCA to exercise
both "foresight and vigilance. '"67
63. Id. at 673-74. Although the Court did not recognize liability based solely on a
defendant's "position in the corporation," at least one court has recognized that
"[tihe line drawn by the Court between a conviction based on corporate position
alone and one based on a 'responsible relationship' to the violation is a fine one, and
arguably no wider than a corporate bylaw. Nevertheless, the Court clearly stated that
a conviction under the Act could not be based on corporate position alone .... "
United States v. New England Grocers Supply Co., 488 F. Supp. 230, 234 (D. Mass.
1980) (discussing Park, 421 U.S. at 674).
64. For example, a corporate marketing vice-president might have ultimate re-
sponsibility for and authority over a shipping warehouse manager who directly vio-
lates the FDCA because she is both aware that drugs have become adulterated and
proceeds to ship them anyway. Under the FDCA's criminal provisions, the shipping
manager could face criminal liability, not because of her awareness, but because of
the Act's strict prohibition on putting adulterated drugs into the stream of com-
merce. Because the shipping manager would, on these facts, be a direct actor, no
resort to Dotterweich and Park would be necessary. Under Dotterweich and Park, a court
could find the marketing vice-president criminally liable as long as her line of author-
ity put her in a position to correct the adulterated drug situation, or her area of
responsibility imposed upon her an affirmative duty to prevent the drugs from be-
coming adulterated or shipped once adulterated, and the vice-president failed to ade-
quately follow through with either task.
65. Park, 421 U.S. at 673-74.
66. Id. at 672.
67. Id. The Park Court recognized these requirements "are beyond question de-
manding, and perhaps onerous, but they are no more stringent than the public has a
right to expect of those who voluntarily assume positions of authority in business
enterprises whose services and products affect the health and well-being of the public
that supports them." Id.
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B. Public Welfare Offenses That Require "Knowledge"
The responsible corporate officer doctrine saw its genesis in
cases involving public welfare statutes that do not contain a
mental culpability standard for criminal offenses. Inroads of
this doctrine into environmental crime cases would thus seem
to depend both on whether a particular environmental statute
is a public welfare statute defining public welfare offenses 68
and, independent of this question, whether the criminal of-
fenses defined by the environmental statute require some de-
gree of culpability.
69
A recent Supreme Court case provides some analytical
guideposts for courts to follow in analyzing public welfare of-
fenses and the culpability requirements specified for such of-
fenses. In Liparota v. United States, the Court addressed the
question of whether the prosecution must prove a defendant
"knew that he was acting in a manner not authorized by statute
or regulations, "70 in light of the food stamp program's prohi-
bition on "knowingly" acquiring or possessing food stamps "in
any manner not authorized by [the statute] or [the]
regulations.'
The Court began its analysis by recognizing that it is Con-
gress' province to define the elements of a criminal offense in
federal crimes, "which are solely creatures of statute."' 7' Re-
garding the element of the offense at issue ("in a manner not
authorized"),73 the Court determined that Congress had not
made explicit the requisite mental state, "[a]lthough Congress
certainly intended by use of the word 'knowingly' to require
some mental state with respect to some element of the crime de-
fined in [the statute] .... ,
The government argued that, despite Congress' use of the
phrase "knowingly ... [is] not authorized," it need only show
(1) that the defendant knew he acquired or possessed food
stamps, and (2) that the manner of his acquisition was in fact
not authorized by statute or regulation. 75 The defendant
68. See infra part IV, section A of this article.
69. See infra part IV, section B of this article.
70. 471 U.S. 419, 421 (1985).
71. Id. at 420 & n.l (quoting 7 U.S.C. § 2024(b)(1) (1982)).
72. Id. at 424 (citing United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32 (1812)).
73. Liparota, 471 U.S. at 423.
74. Id. at 424 (emphasis in original).
75. Id. at 423.
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urged the interpretation ultimately adopted by the Court;
namely, that a person must both (1) know he has acquired or
possessed food stamps and (2) know he has done so in an un-
authorized manner.76 The Court indicated either interpreta-
tion would comport both with congressional intent in using the
term "knowingly" and with "ordinary usage" of that term.77
However, this statement by the Court appears to be based on
the inherent ambiguity concerning which elements of the of-
fense the term "knowingly" modifies 78 and not on any inherent
ambiguity with the scope of a "knowing" mental state itself.
The Court's holding in Liparota, that the term "knowingly"
indicates a defendant must be shown to have known his actions
were unauthorized by statute or regulation, does not mean the
prosecution must prove a defendant's knowledge of illegal-
ity.79 Although the Liparota opinion is not without internal in-
consistencies,8 0 the Court appears to require the prosecution,
in cases involving a "knowing" mental state, to show the de-
fendant knew his conduct was not authorized by the relevant
statute or regulations, but not that his conduct was illegal." In
proving the defendant knew his conduct was unauthorized, the
prosecution need not show the defendant had knowledge of
the specific regulations at issue and knowingly breached
them.8 2 Regarding the evidence necessary to show the defend-
ant's knowledge, the Court agreed that the prosecution need
not introduce "extraordinary evidence" that "conclusively
demonstrate[s]" the defendant's mental state: "Rather, as in
any other criminal prosecution requiring mere rea, the Govern-
ment may prove by reference to facts and circumstances sur-
rounding the case that petitioner knew that his conduct was
unauthorized or illegal."83
The other important point of Liparota is the limited reading
the Court placed on what constitutes a public welfare offense.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 424-25 n.7.
78. Id.
79. See Comment, supra note 5, at 74 and accompanying text.
80. Id. at 74 & n.158.
81. Liparota, 471 U.S. at 434.
82. Instead, Liparota requires the government to show a defendant's awareness of
the facts or circumstances that Congress, in drafting elements of an offense, has de-
termined are material to that offense. A fact with a legal element thus requires the
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The government in Liparota urged the Court to ignore or di-
lute the "knowing" requirement, solely on the basis that the
food stamp offense was a "public welfare offense." 4 The
Court, however, emphasized that such offenses are tradition-
ally limited to ones which " 'depend on no mental element but
consist only of forbidden acts or omissions.' "85 The Court re-
jected the government's argument, indicating that the food
stamp offense "differs substantially from those 'public welfare
offenses' we have previously recognized."" 6 The Court indi-
cated that its previous decisions on public welfare offenses
involved statutes where "Congress has rendered criminal a
type of conduct that a reasonable person should know is sub-
ject to stringent public regulation and may seriously threaten
the community's health or safety."8 7 The Court distinguished
the food stamp offense at issue in Liparota from an offense re-
garding possession of unregistered hand grenades 8 and one
regarding adulterated and misbranded drugs.8 9 The unregis-
tered hand grenade offense was distinguishable because no
reasonable person would assume the activity was unregu-
lated;90 the adulterated drug offense was distinguishable be-
cause the FDCA strictly prohibited shipment of adulterated
drugs without regard to "'consciousness of wrongdoing.' "9'
The Court thus indicated that the public welfare offense
designation has limited applicability; that is, (1) where an activ-
84. In a footnote accompanying this statement, the Court identified several facts
and circumstances in the Liparota case that would allow a trier of fact to infer the
defendant's knowledge that his acquisition or possession of food stamps was unau-
thorized. This evidence included purchase of the food stamps at a substantial dis-
count, conducting the transaction "in a back room of his restaurant to avoid the
presence of other patrons," and the fact that the food stamps are themselves marked
"nontransferable." Id. at 434 n.17.
85. Id. at 432 (quoting Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 252-53 (1952)).
86. Id. at 432-33.
87. Id. at 433.
88. Id. (citing United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601 (1971)). The Court also made
passing reference to United States v. International Minerals & Chem. Corp., 402 U.S.
558, 564-65 (1971). In International Minerals, the Court focused on public health and
safety issues surrounding the handling and shipping of hazardous materials. Interna-
tional Minerals, 402 U.S. at 559.
89. Liparota, 471 U.S. at 433 (citing United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277,
284 (1943)).
90. Liparota, 402 U.S. at 433. " '[O]ne would hardly be surprised to learn that
possession of hand grenades is not an innocent act.' " Id. (quoting United States v.
Freed, 401 U.S. 601, 609 (1971)).
91. Liparota, 402 U.S. at 433 (quoting Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 284). See also
United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250 (1922).
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ity affecting human health or safety is so dangerous it can be
presumed to be subject to regulation and a reasonable person
engaged in the activity can be presumed to know the activity is
likely to be regulated, or (2) where a statute defines a criminal
offense without regard to "consciousness of wrongdoing."
III. JUDICIAL APPLICATION OF CRIMINAL LAW PRINCIPLES TO
"KNOWING" ENVIRONMENTAL CRIMES
The scope of the "knowing" mental state required in most
federal environmental statutes, as well as the applicability of
the legal principles addressed in parts I and II of this article,
have not been clarified by recent judicial decisions in the envi-
ronmental crimes area. The following review of two recent de-
cisions involving environmental crimes illustrates that a
coherent analytical approach for these cases is lacking.
A. United States v. Johnson & Towers, Inc.
In United States v. Johnson & Towers, Inc. ,92 the Court of Ap-
peals for the Third Circuit construed section 6928(d)(2)(A) of
the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), which
prohibits the knowing disposal of hazardous waste without a
permit.9 3 Acquisition of a permit is governed by a separate
provision of RCRA, which states that only owners or operators
of a hazardous waste facility must obtain a permit to dispose of
hazardous waste.94
Because the defendants in the Johnson & Towers case were
employees rather than owners or operators of a hazardous
waste facility, the court first had to determine that the criminal
penalty provision of RCRA applied to employees. In so hold-
ing, the court indicated that, like owners and operators, em-
ployees must be shown to have been aware that they were
disposing of hazardous waste in order for the criminal provi-
sions to apply.95 In addition, employees (but not necessarily
owners and operators) must also be shown to be aware that
their company was required to obtain a disposal permit, but
did not in fact have one. The Third Circuit, therefore, ruled
92. 741 F.2d 662 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied sub nom. Angel v. United States, 469
U.S. 1208 (1985).
93. See 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(2)(A) (Supp. V 1987).
94. See 42 U.S.C. § 6925 (1982).
95. Johnson & Towers, 741 F.2d at 668.
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that the prosecution had to show that the employee defendants
knew (1) they were disposing of materials; (2) which were haz-
ardous wastes; (3) at a facility for which there was no RCRA
permit; and (4) that a permit requirement existed under the
statute and regulations.96
In reaching this result, the Johnson & Towers court first ana-
lyzed whether the "knowing" requirement modified only cer-
tain elements of the offense or the entire sentence describing
the offense. In resolving this question, the court indicated that
the provision involved was part of a public welfare statute.
The court determined that RCRA qualified as a public welfare
statute because, like the FDCA in Park and Dotterweich, the con-
gressional purpose in RCRA was "to control hazards that, 'in
the circumstances of modem industrialism, are largely beyond
self-protection.' 97 The court reasoned that, because in the
FDCA cases it was appropriate to read the statutes as having
no mens rea requirement, it was appropriate to remove the
"knowing" state of mind requirement from one or more of the
elements defining the RCRA offense.9" The Third Circuit also
indicated that, because public welfare statutes are to be con-
strued in order to effectuate their regulatory purposes, an in-
terpretation eliminating a mental state requirement from
certain elements of an offense was appropriate. After evaluat-
ing the public policy justifications, congressional intent, and
the language and structure of section 6928(d), the Third Cir-
cuit nevertheless concluded that it would be "arbitrary and
nonsensical" to completely remove a mental state
requirement. 99
Ultimately, the Third Circuit employed a balancing test to
determine whether "knowingly" modified only the first two or
all of the elements of the offense defined in section
6928(d)(2)(A). The court found several factors that weighed in
favor of requiring a higher culpability standard than the mini-
mum allowed for public welfare statutes, including overall fair-
ness and statutory consistency,' 00 the fact that the defendants
were merely employees rather than owners or operators of a
96. Id. at 668-69.
97. Id. at 667 (quoting Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 280).
98. Id. at 668.




Hansen: "Knowing" Environmental Crimes
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1990
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
facility,'"' the public policy concerns regarding hazardous
wastes, 0 2 and the difficulty of the government's burden of
proof.10 3 Thus, although the Johnson & Towers court held that
the "knowing" requirement applied to each element of the of-
fense, ' 0 4 the court also stated that on remand the district court
could apply the "responsible relationship" test to show the de-
fendants' knowledge.'
0 5
The Third Circuit's diversion into a discussion of how the
public welfare character of RCRA altered its analysis of the
"knowing" mental state requirement was unwarranted under
Dotterweich and Park. Like many commentators, 0 6 the Third
Circuit assumed, without analysis, that federal environmental
statutes are automatically "public welfare statutes" for pur-
poses of engaging in the Dotterweich and Park analysis.'0 7 This
presumption by courts and commentators alike appears to be
based on the fact that federal environmental statutes are
designed to protect the public health and the environment,
similar to the FDCA's protection of human health and safety.
This reflexive approach is misguided because it juxtaposes
"knowing" crimes with an analytical model that has little, if
any, applicability where a statute defines an offense in terms of
a culpability requirement.
The Johnson & Towers court, therefore, assumed that, because
RCRA addresses issues of public concern, it is a "public wel-
fare statute" subject to the strict liability analysis of Dotterweich
and Park.'0 8 This bootstrapping by the court also was inappro-
priate in that it led the court to presume the "responsible rela-
tionship" doctrine was applicable to show the defendants'
knowledge.'0 9 Where a statute specifies a culpability require-
ment, it is not at all clear that the responsible relationship anal-
101. Id. at 664-67.
102. Id. at 666-67.
103. Id. at 669.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 670.
106. See, e.g., McMurry & Ramsey, Environmental Crime: The Use of Criminal Sanctions
in Enforcing Environmental Laws, 19 Loy. L.A.L. REv. 1133, 1151 (1986) (assuming a
lower culpability requirement for environmental crimes based on assumption that
environmental laws generally are public welfare statutes).
107. Johnson & Towers, 741 F.2d at 666-67.
108. See supra notes 55-67 and accompanying text.
109. For a discussion of the "responsible relationship" doctrine see supra notes
51-67 and accompanying text.
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ysis--developed because of the balance struck by Congress in
strict liability statutes-is appropriate, much less applicable.
B. United States v. Hayes International Corp.
An Eleventh Circuit case decided a year after Liparota also
illustrates a reflexive rather than analytical approach to the
public welfare statute issue. In addition, this case reflects the
confusion engendered by the Liparota Court's interchangeable
use of "illegal" and "unauthorized" in its discussion of the
scope of a "knowing" culpability requirement. In Hayes, a mis-
reading of Liparota led to the court effectively employing the
willful blindness doctrine without analyzing the appropriate-
ness of its use on the facts.
In United States v. Hayes International Corp., the Eleventh Cir-
cuit construed section 6928(d)(1) of RCRA, which prohibits
the knowing transportation of hazardous waste to a facility
which does not have a permit under section 6925 of RCRA." 0
The Hayes court recognized "Congress did not provide any
guidance, either in the statute or the legislative history, con-
cerning the meaning of 'knowing' in section 6928(d).""'
Rather than engaging in determining the scope of the knowing
requirement, however, the Eleventh Circuit moved immedi-
ately to a discussion of the elements of the offense in section
6928(d)(1) to which the knowing requirement applied.
In finding that a defendant's knowledge of the specific regu-
lations at issue was not required for purposes of the criminal
provision, the Eleventh Circuit confronted the Liparota opin-
ion, which the Eleventh Circuit viewed as holding that knowl-
edge of illegality was necessary."i 2 As indicated previously, the
Liparota Court distinguished between "illegal" and "unauthor-
ized" action, albeit in a footnote.' '3 Because the Hayes court
interpreted section 6928(d)(1) as not making knowledge of il-
legality an element of the offense, the court concluded that
Liparota was not controlling." 4 The Eleventh Circuit also read
the Supreme Court's opinion as indicating that any significant
regulatory program that affects public health and safety by def-
110. 786 F.2d 1499 (11 th Cir. 1986).
111. Id. at 1502; see also 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(1) (Supp. V 1987).
112. Hayes, 786 F.2d at 1502-03.
113. Liparota, 471 U.S. at 425 n.9. See also Comment, supra note 5, at 74.
114. Hayes, 786 F.2d at 1503.
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inition qualifies as a public welfare statute for purposes of the
public welfare offense analysis. As an apparent further basis
for distinguishing Liparota, the Eleventh Circuit hastily con-
cluded that "section 6928(d)(1) is undeniably a public welfare
statute, involving a heavily regulated area with great ramifica-
tions for the public health and safety." '"15 Drawing on these
two perceived differences from Liparota, and without citing any
authority, the Hayes court continued: "As the Supreme Court
has explained, it is completely fair and reasonable to charge
those who choose to operate in such areas with knowledge of
the regulatory provisions. . . . Accordingly, in a prosecution
under 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(1) it would be no defense to claim
no knowledge that the paint waste was a hazardous waste
within the meaning of the regulations; nor would it be a de-
fense to argue ignorance of the permit requirement."
'"1 6
In reaching this conclusion, the Hayes court appears to have
relied on a pre-Liparota Supreme Court opinion, United States v.
International Minerals & Chemical Corp. ,"' which analyzed a haz-
ardous materials transportation statute in which Congress cre-
ated an offense of "knowingly violating a regulation." In
International Minerals, the defendant was charged with "know-
ingly" violating an Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC)
regulation which prohibited shipping hazardous materials
without indicating the nature of the materials on the shipping
manifest."' The Supreme Court held that knowledge of the
specific regulation-requiring that the shipping manifests re-
flect the nature of the materials shipped-was not an element
of the offense. Instead, the use of the term "knowingly" in the
statute referred only to the defendant's knowledge that the
materials being shipped were dangerous."' As the Hayes court
explained: "The Court [in International Minerals] noted the gen-
eral maxim that ignorance of the law is no excuse, but also rea-
soned that where 'obnoxious waste materials are involved, the
probability of regulation is so great that anyone who is aware
that he is in possession of them or dealing with them must be
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. 402 U.S. 558 (1971).
118. Id. at 559.
119. Id. at 565.
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presumed to be aware of the regulation.' "120 Thus, the Hayes
court apparently relied on this passage from the International
Minerals case, both to support its conclusion that the RCRA
provision at issue was "undeniably a public welfare statute"
and to presume knowledge by the defendants of "the regula-
tory provisions" generally.'
2 '
Justice Brennan, who wrote the majority opinion in Liparota,
dissented in International Minerals and found it clear under the
statute involved "that Congress made punishable only know-
ing violations of the regulation in question."'' 2 2 The majority
in Liparota cited International Minerals as support for the notion
that, among the public welfare offenses recognized by the
Supreme Court, there are statutes regulating activities that are
so dangerous or threatening to public safety that "one would
hardly be surprised to learn" the activities are regulated.
21
Liparota's emphasis on the strict liability nature of public wel-
fare offenses,124 coupled with the Court's requirement that the
government prove a defendant's acts were unauthorized,12 5 in-
dicates that the reference in Liparota to International Minerals
was not intended to drive analysis of "knowing" environmental
crimes under the public welfare offense doctrine. Thus, the
Hayes court's application of the Supreme Court caselaw to (1)
define all crimes in "heavily regulated area(s) with great ramifi-
cations for the public health and safety" as public welfare of-
fenses, and (2) allow a presumption of knowledge of specific
regulations in "knowing" public welfare offenses 126 is simply
inaccurate.
A more consistent reading of International Minerals and
Liparota, giving consideration to Justice Brennan's role as dis-
senter and majority opinion writer, respectively, is that both
cases held that the government need not show a defendant's
knowledge of a specific regulation in proving a criminal offense
for violating that regulation, and that a presumption of knowl-
120. Hayes, 786 F.2d at 1502 (quoting United States v. International Minerals &
Chem. Corp., 402 U.S. 558, 565 (1971)).
121. Hayes, 786 F.2d at 1503.
122. International Minerals, 402 U.S. at 565 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
123. Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 433 (1985) (quoting United States v.
Freed, 401 U.S. 601, 609 (1971)).
124. Liparota, 471 U.S. at 432.
125. Liparota, 471 U.S. at 425 & n.9.
126. United States v. Hayes Int'l Corp., 786 F.2d 1499, 1503 (11th Cir. 1986).
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edge that one's activities are likely to be subject to regulation is
appropriate where certain types of activities are involved. To
the extent International Minerals may have broadened the uni-
verse of "public welfare offenses" by allowing a presumption
of knowledge that an activity is regulated solely on the basis
that the activity involves materials very likely to be subject to
regulation, 27 Liparota appears to limit use of the presumption
to show that a particular statute defines a public welfare of-
fense. 12  In other words, the universe of public welfare of-
fenses includes strict liability crimes, as well as instances where
"Congress has rendered criminal a type of conduct that a rea-
sonable person should know is subject to stringent public reg-
ulation and may seriously threaten the community's health or
safety."1 29 Given the Liparota majority's holding that a "know-
ing" offense requires proof of a defendant's knowledge that his
acts were "unauthorized," the presumption of knowledge of an
activity's regulated status to show culpability, articulated in Inter-
national Minerals and relied upon by Hayes, may have limited
continued validity. Thus, after Liparota it is questionable
whether in a case involving a "knowing" public welfare offense
a court can allow a presumption of defendant's knowledge that
his activities are regulated for purposes of demonstrating cul-
pability under a "knowing" statute. Even if such a presump-
tion remains appropriate, Liparota makes clear that knowledge
beyond that required by the Court in International Minerals is
now required in such cases.'
30
Finally, the Hayes court's conclusion that knowledge of ille-
gality is not an element of an offense under RCRA is entirely
consistent with a proper reading of the Liparota opinion. What
the Hayes court failed to address was the distinction drawn in
Liparota between actions that are "illegal" and actions that are
"unauthorized." Liparota indicates that, if there is a legal ele-
ment in the definition of the "knowing" offense as written by
Congress, then the government must prove circumstances that
involve knowledge of the legal element: "The knowledge in-
volved is solely knowledge of the circumstances that the law
127. United States v. International Minerals & Chem. Corp., 402 U.S. 558, 565
(1971).
128. Liparota, 471 U.S. at 433-34.
129. Id. at 433.
130. Id. at 425 n.9.
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has defined as material to the offense."' 3' l Such a requirement
involves knowledge of some law, but not "consciousness of
wrongdoing" in the sense of knowledge that one's actions are
illegal.13 2 The principle that ignorance of the law is no excuse
only when a defendant is ignorant that conduct was "prohib-
ited or illegal" is precisely the position adopted by the Liparota
Court in distinguishing between unauthorized and illegal ac-
tion.13 3 In other words, Liparota goes as far as allowing a de-
fense of ignorance that conduct is unauthorized, even though
Liparota does not create a defense of ignorance of illegality." 4
Thus, if an element of the offense at issue requires a defend-
ant's knowledge of a fact, which fact itself contains a legal ele-
ment, then awareness of the legal element appears to be a
prerequisite to finding knowledge that one's conduct was "un-
authorized." In Hayes, for example, some awareness of the
specific regulations was a legal element necessary to finding
one element of the offense at issue, i.e., whether the facility to
which the waste was transported had a RCRA permit. Under a
Liparota analysis, the government would have to show that a
defendant was familiar enough with RCRA to recognize a
RCRA permit, or knew enough to inquire as to its existence.
Presuming defendant's knowledge of the specific regulations
solely because of the nature of the industry and materials han-
dled would not suffice. Thus, in misreading the Liparota opin-
ion to require knowledge of illegality, the Hayes court
fundamentally misconstrued the RCRA provision at issue.
IV. CONDUCT CONSTITUTING AN ENVIRONMENTAL CRIME
As the preceding discussion demonstrates, there is consider-
able confusion as to the scope of required knowledge and the
applicability of a public welfare offense analysis in "knowing"
environmental crime cases. The caselaw demonstrates that a
misreading of Liparota will lead a court to eviscerate a knowl-
edge requirement in contravention of congressional intent.
The caselaw to date also does not adequately address two criti-
cal questions, namely, whether the public welfare offense
model should apply to "knowing" crimes, and, if so, how. Ap-
131. United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601, 615 (1971) (Brennan, J., concurring).
132. Id.
133. Liparota, 471 U.S. at 425 n.9.
134. See Comment, supra note 5, at 78.
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plying the Supreme Court's public welfare offense analysis in
"knowing" crimes allows courts to lower the threshold mental
state required for a particular offense. In Hayes, for example,
the court relied on the public welfare offense label to allow a
presumption of defendant's knowledge of material elements of
a crime. In Johnson & Towers, the court's misplaced reliance on
the public welfare offense analysis led to an inappropriate ap-
plication of the Dotterweich and Park responsible relationship
test in the context of a "knowing" crime.
A fair reading of Supreme Court cases demonstrates that,
while environmental laws may be "public welfare statutes" in
that they are designed to protect human health and the envi-
ronment, such laws do not necessarily contain "public welfare
offenses." Thus, although environmental crimes may occur in
industries subject to heavy regulation, this circumstance alone
is insufficient to qualify the statutory offense as a "public wel-
fare offense." Even if an environmental crime is a public wel-
fare offense, however, the knowledge requirement should not
be presumptively cast aside by courts. Where Congress has
specified a particular mental state for the environmental of-
fense, Liparota indicates that courts are to require proof of a
defendant's awareness of all the facts and circumstances-in-
cluding legal elements-that Congress defined as material to
the offense. Liparota thus has relevance to determining the ap-
propriate use of the willful blindness and collective knowledge
principles in environmental crime cases, including any such
crimes that qualify as public welfare offenses. A court's failure
to make these necessary distinctions will tend to criminalize in-
nocent conduct, and effectively substitute strict liability or neg-
ligence for a knowing mental state in environmental offenses.
A. When is an Environmental Crime a Public Welfare Offense?
Both the Hayes and the Johnson & Towers opinions character-
ize RCRA as a public welfare statute because it involves perva-
sive regulation of the handling of hazardous waste and has as
its overall purpose the protection of public welfare interests,
namely, human health and the environment.' This charac-
terization of RCRA (or other environmental statutes) is true, as
far as it goes. What these courts and some commentators have
135. See United States v. Hayes Int'l Corp., 786 F.2d 1499, 1502 (11 th Cir. 1986);
United States v. Johnson & Towers, 741 F.2d 662, 667 (3d Cir. 1984).
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assumed, without critical analysis, is that crimes defined in
such statutes should automatically be considered "public wel-
fare offenses" for purposes of culpability analysis. ' 3 6 A critical
review of Supreme Court precedent makes clear, however, that
public welfare offenses are crimes requiring more than mere
creation under a public welfare statute.
A public welfare offense is found where a public welfare stat-
ute defines a criminal offense without regard to "consciousness
of wrongdoing."'' 3 7 In other words, the statute criminalizes
certain conduct essentially on a strict liability basis. The classic
example of this type of public welfare offense is the shipment
of adulterated drugs under the FDCA, as in Dotterweich and
Park.'38 Thus, where the statute in question imposes an abso-
lute "duty of care or duty of action," non-compliance with that
duty for any reason is a criminal offense. 3 9 Important to rec-
ognize with such offenses is that Congress, not the courts, de-
fined the crime in question so as to eliminate a culpability
requirement. 140
The second type of public welfare offense recognized by the
Supreme Court involves activities impacting human health and
safety that are considered so dangerous that the activity can be
presumed to be subject to regulation.' 4' A necessary corollary
to this presumption is that a reasonable person engaged in the
activity can be presumed to be aware that the activity is likely
to be regulated. 42 Thus, earlier Supreme Court cases analyz-
ing this type of public welfare offense indicated it was appro-
priate to hold a defendant to a "reasonableness" standard, in
terms of awareness that a dangerous activity has a likelihood of
being subject to stringent regulation. 43 Under this approach,
knowledge of specific regulations defining the violative acts or
136. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 5, at 61 ("Most environmental crimes fit into
this relatively new class of public welfare offenses."); McMurry & Ramsey, supra note
106, at 1151-52 (1986) (assuming a lower culpability requirement for environmental
crimes based on the assumption that environmental laws generally are public welfare
statutes).
137. United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601, 615 (Brennan, J., concurring).
138. See supra notes 57 and 62 and accompanying text.
139. See Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 255 (1952).
140. See Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 424, 427 (1985).
141. Id. at 433.
142. Id. See also United States v. International Minerals & Chem. Corp., 402 U.S.
558, 564-65 (1971).
143. See Liparota, 471 U.S. at 433.
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omissions was not necessary, even under a "knowing viola-
tion" statute.
In International Minerals, therefore, it was not necessary to
show the defendant's awareness of the specific regulations re-
quiring labelling of hazardous materials and prohibiting ship-
ment of unlabelled materials; the government was only
required to show that defendant knew he had shipped danger-
ous materials and that those materials were in fact unlabelled.
Once the defendant's awareness of the dangerous nature of
the materials was shown, a "reasonableness" test regarding the
defendant's awareness of the likelihood of regulation of these
materials was appropriate to show culpability under the
"knowing violation" standard.
Whether a particular environmental crime falls within this
second category of public welfare offense turns on the Liparota
Court's inquiry: Does the offense involve a human health and
safety statute that criminalizes acts or omissions that reason-
able people should know is subject to regulation?' 4 4 Under
this view of a public welfare offense, it is arguable that offenses
requiring knowledge by definition require more than mere
negligence as to the existence of regulation (i.e., the "reason-
able person should know" standard set forth in Liparota), and
that such offenses are thus never "public welfare offenses."
However, Liparota and its predecessor cases indicate that the
presumption which attaches is the defendant's awareness of
the likelihood of regulation, not a presumption of the defend-
ant's awareness of particular regulations prohibiting specific
acts or omissions.' 45 If the presumption is applied in this lim-
ited manner, the "knowledge" analysis in Liparota is not
abrogated.
Thus, the Liparota Court's analysis classifies a statutory crime
as a public welfare offense if it involves activities that no rea-
sonable person would assume are unregulated. This approach
does not presume a defendant's knowledge or awareness of
specific acts or omissions that are necessary to show an ele-
ment of the offense.' 4 6 Deeming an environmental crime a
public welfare offense at most allows a court to presume a de-
fendant was aware that his activities were of a type likely to be
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. See supra notes 139-42 and accompanying text.
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subject to regulation. Under Liparota, the knowledge require-
ment specified in the statute is not satisfied by a showing of
this type of awareness because it demonstrates only that a de-
fendant was negligent in being unaware that his activities were
likely to be regulated. "Knowing" public welfare offenses still
require a showing of a defendant's awareness of facts and cir-
cumstances that the statute defines as material to the offense.
In effect, the International Minerals approach allowed courts
to presume a defendant's knowledge of the regulated status of
a dangerous activity as a substitute for showing the defendant's
acts or omissions were engaged in with some awareness by the
defendant that they were prohibited. After Liparota, this aspect
of the International Minerals approach has come into question
for public welfare offenses that have a knowledge requirement.
Under Liparota, a court can presume only that a defendant was
aware of the likelihood his activities were regulated. The pros-
ecution in an environmental crime must still demonstrate the
defendant's awareness of fact or circumstances that are mate-
rial to elements of a crime. The scope of this demonstration is
the focus of the remainder of this article.
B. What Must the Prosecution Show for a "Knowing"
Environmental Crime?
In the majority of federal environmental statutes, Congress
specified a particular mental state for the environmental of-
fense. In this circumstance, Liparota indicates that courts are to
require proof of a defendant's awareness of all the facts and
circumstances, including legal elements, that Congress defined
as material to the offense. A court's failure to hold the prose-
cution to this proof will tend to criminalize innocent conduct
by effectively substituting strict liability or negligence for the
knowledge requirement in environmental offenses.
Courts should not overlook the significance of the fact that
Congress chose from among several possible mental states in
defining environmental crimes to require a defendant's knowl-
edge of the elements. Under the Model Penal Code and mod-
em criminal jurisprudence, a knowledge requirement in a
statutory criminal provision requires consciousness by the de-
fendant of the facts or circumstances that are material to show-
ing elements of the offense. Since a knowing mental state
requires consciousness, it is clear that a knowing mental state
1990] 1015
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cannot be shown by proving a defendant's negligence or
recklessness.147
Negligence, as a mental state, by definition is distinguished
from intentional, knowing, or reckless mental states in that it
does not involve a state of awareness or consciousness.1
48 If
one acts in a criminally negligent manner, by definition he is
not aware of the risk created and, therefore, cannot be guilty of
having consciously disregarded that risk. 149 The conscious-
ness required by a knowing mental state is also not met by
showing a defendant's recklessness. While recklessness and
knowing behavior are similar in that both require a state of
awareness of a risk, the degree of awareness is critical. In reck-
lessness, the awareness is of a probability, while in knowing
behavior, the awareness is of a certain risk.'t 0 Recklessness is
also distinguished from a knowing state of mind because it in-
volves conscious risk creation.'' Finally, a reckless state of
mind must also be shown by demonstrating that the risk con-
sciously disregarded by the defendant was both substantial and
unjustifiable.' 52
Application of the willful blindness doctrine, for example,
can inappropriately erode the distinction between knowing
and negligent states of mind. The willful blindness doctrine
essentially entails the following analysis: (1) there was a single,
objectively reasonable course of action for the defendant to
take; (2) the defendant failed to take this course of action; (3)
since there were no other objectively reasonable choices, the
courts will presume the defendant purposefully failed to take
the single course available; (4) courts will infer from this fail-
ure to choose the objectively reasonable path that the defend-
ant had "knowledge" of the facts necessary to support
elements of an offense; and (5) courts will thus find the defend-
ant criminally liable. Because the willful blindness doctrine
rests on the notion that only one objectively reasonable course
147. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (1985) (distinguishing among four mental
states).
148. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2) (defining the separate kinds of culpability
and the necessary elements of each).
149. See W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTr, supra note 9, § 3.7(c), at 334.
150. See id. § 3.7(0, at 336-37.
151. See Siffert & McDonagh, Recklessness and Gross Negligence as Requisite Mental Ele-
ments in Criminal and Civil Cases, 140 PRAc. LAW INST. 171, 176 (1985) (the course was
entitled: Mens Rea: State of Mind Defenses in Criminal and Civil Fraud Cases).
152. Id. at 176-77.
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of action was available to a defendant, culpability is based on
mere negligence, rather than on the defendant's awareness of
the action or need for action that he is held responsible for
failing to take or recognize.
Liparota reaffirmed that, when Congress specifies a knowing
mental state, courts must require prosecutors to show a de-
fendant's actual awareness of facts and circumstances that are
material to elements of the offense. The Liparota Court indi-
cated that the prosecution's burden of proving such knowledge
could be eased by the use of inferences to show a defendant's
awareness of pertinent facts and circumstances.15 3 In the con-
text of environmental crimes, however, Congress has demon-
strated that it knows how to dilute a statutory standard of
knowledge by allowing proof of that knowledge through infer-
ences. The "knowing endangerment" provision of RCRA, for
example, criminalizes conduct that involves a "knowing"
RCRA violation, 54 coupled with knowledge at the time of the
violation that the conduct places another person in imminent
danger of death or serious bodily injury.' 55 The statute then
sets forth "special rules" for purposes of interpreting the
knowledge required to show these violations.
In RCRA's "special rules," in section 6928(0(1), Congress
verified that a knowing state of mind requires a showing of a
defendant's awareness of pertinent facts and circumstances. 156
The statute also specifies that knowledge, for purposes of the
imminent danger/serious bodily injury portion of the knowing
endangerment provision, means a defendant's "actual aware-
ness or actual belief," and that "knowledge possessed by a per-
son other than the defendant, but not by the defendant
himself, may not be attributed to the defendant."' 157 In addi-
tion, for knowing endangerment offenses, Congress provided
that prosecutors may use circumstantial evidence to prove a
defendant's actual knowledge "including evidence that the de-
fendant took affirmative steps to shield himself from relevant
information." 5 8
Congress thus specified in section 6928(0(1) that a knowing
153. Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 434 (1985).
154. 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d) (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
155. 42 U.S.C. § 6928(e) (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
156. See 42 U.S.C. § 6928(0(1) (1982).




Hansen: "Knowing" Environmental Crimes
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1990
WILLIAM MITCHELL LA W REVIEW
violation under RCRA section 6928(d) requires a defendant's
actual knowledge. This knowledge requirement was not made
subject to the proviso regarding circumstantial evidence, in-
cluding evidence of deliberate ignorance. The proviso in this
section applies only to "proving the defendant's possession of
actual knowledge;" it is only with respect to knowledge of im-
minent danger or serious bodily harm that the statute requires
the defendant's possession of actual awareness or actual be-
lief.'5 9 Thus, Congress made clear that only with respect to a
defendant's knowledge that his conduct placed another person
in imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury would cir-
cumstantial evidence, including deliberate ignorance, be avail-
able to prove the defendant's possession of actual knowledge.
By negative implication, therefore, Congress did not view the
use of such circumstantial evidence as appropriate in proving
actual awareness for purposes of a knowing violation of RCRA.
This conclusion comports well with the Liparota Court's reem-
phasis that knowledge in a statutory criminal provision means
consciousness or awareness. This conclusion also is consistent
with the modem view in criminal jurisprudence that knowl-
edge is clearly distinguishable from merely reckless or negli-
gent behavior. Since the latter types of behavior are what is in
fact proved when a court resorts to inferences of knowledge
from circumstantial evidence, it is clear that, in environmental
criminal provisions requiring a knowing state of mind, courts
should make sparing use of the criminal jurisprudence princi-
ples discussed in parts I and II of this article.
Two circumstances in which cautious application of these
principles is particularly appropriate include: (1) where an
omission or a duty to inquire or act is involved and the prose-
cution moves for a deliberate ignorance instruction, and (2)
where a statutory violation has occurred despite due diligence
by a responsible corporate officer, and the prosecution asserts
the responsible corporate officer is strictly liable for that non-
compliance notwithstanding his exercise of "foresight and vigi-
lance." A failure by the courts to give meaning to a knowledge
requirement will tend to result in criminal convictions for this
type of conduct, which is traditionally viewed as merely negli-
gent. In addition, if courts allow doctrines such as deliberate
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lute a knowledge requirement, the result will be criminaliza-
tion of conduct which is already subject to civil enforcement on
a strict liability basis for noncompliance with statutory
requirements.
It is a basic precept of criminal law that criminal liability
which is dependent on a requisite mental state requires more
than a mere failure by a defendant to conform his conduct to
prescribed standards. Most federal environmental statutes im-
pose strict civil liability for failure to comply with statutory pro-
visions or regulations, regardless of the reason for the failure.
Thus, a particular defendant could behave negligently, reck-
lessly, or with absolute "foresight and vigilance;" if there is
noncompliance with a regulation or statutory provision, the
link between the defendant's mental state and the violation is
simply irrelevant to whether civil liability attaches, although it
may be relevant to the imposition of penalties. By imposing
strict civil liability for statutory or regulatory noncompliance,
Congress has indicated that, for purposes of civil violations, it
does not matter that a defendant was careful or careless. The
standard of performance has been defined, the defendant has
not met that standard, and Congress has specified that non-
conformance with this standard triggers strict liability. Mere
noncompliance with a statute or regulation, however, is not
traditionally considered a basis for criminal liability, and in-
deed, is not the basis for criminal liability in any environmental
statute where Congress has specified a knowing state of
mind. l16
Consider, for example, a situation in which criminal prose-
cution is initiated on the basis of a defendant's failure to act
where the regulations impose a duty to act, or his failure to
inquire where the regulations impose a duty to inquire. Ab-
sent a "smoking gun" demonstrating the defendant's actual
awareness of a duty, the prosecution would likely seek a delib-
erate ignorance instruction to show that the defendant should
have known of his duty to act or inquire. Where the prosecu-
tion seeks to impose criminal liability on the basis of an omis-
sion, a danger always exists that liability may be imposed for
that omission "when the defendant was either unaware of the
160. Compare the strict liability criminal provisions in United States v. Park, 421
U.S. 658 (1975) and United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943) with those
cited for environmental statutes in supra note 3.
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facts giving rise to the duty to act or unaware of the existence
or scope of the legal duty."''M The deliberate ignorance in-
struction in these circumstances would allow criminal liability
to be imposed based on a defendant's negligent or reckless
failure to recognize the existence or scope of the legal duty, or
to recognize the facts giving rise to the duty to act.
When a statute requires a defendant's knowledge before
criminal liability will attach, the Liparota opinion appears to
make the use of the deliberate ignorance instruction inappro-
priate if its use will result in criminal liability on the basis of a
mental state less than a knowing mental state. In other words,
under Liparota, if a statute specifies a knowing mental state, a
defendant may not be held liable because of a deliberate igno-
rance instruction, based on negligence or recklessness, if the
defendant in fact does not know the facts or circumstances in-
dicating a duty to act or inquire.
16 2
The prosecution under most environmental statutes can
likely make a reasonable argument that such statutes impose
both a duty to act reasonably in ascertaining the facts, as well
as a duty to take reasonable action once certain facts become
known to the defendant. If a defendant is negligent in ascer-
taining the facts, the duty to take action will never become
known to him. As written, the federal environmental statutes
generally subject this conduct to strict liability on the civil en-
forcement side, rather than knowing criminal liability. This re-
sult is consistent with the Model Penal Code's and the Ninth
Circuit's recognition that deliberate ignorance is not equally
culpable with knowledge, unless a defendant recognizes and
subsequently ignores a duty to act or inquire. 6 1 If the reason
for a defendant's nonrecognition of a duty is that he was negli-
gent or reckless in failing to ascertain pertinent facts, the req-
uisite culpability for a knowing mental state is simply not
present. 6 ' Under such circumstances, Congress has dictated
that civil enforcement on a strict liability basis, rather than
criminal enforcement on a knowing basis, is the appropriate
course of action for the regulatory agencies to pursue.
161. W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTr, supra note 9, § 3.3(b), at 289.
162. Id.
163. See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
164. See United States v. Pacific Hide & Fur Depot, Inc., 768 F.2d 1096, 1098 (9th
Cir. 1985) ("It is not enough that defendant was mistaken, recklessly disregarded the
truth, or negligently failed to inquire.").
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Another circumstance in which the line between civil and
criminal liability can be blurred by use of the deliberate igno-
rance doctrine is where a defendant is aware of pertinent facts
but, even with knowledge of those facts, is unaware of the
existence or scope of a duty to act or inquire. By application of
the general principle that ignorance of the law is no defense,
even Liparota would appear to suggest that such a circumstance
might constitute an adequate basis for a criminal prosecution.
However, the Liparota Court's distinction between conduct that
is illegal and conduct that is unauthorized requires courts to
conduct a critical analysis of the defendant's knowledge of all
facts that the statute makes material to the offense.' 65 If Con-
gress has defined an environmental crime so that the duty to
act or the duty to inquire is a material element of the crime,
Liparota instructs that the prosecution must show the defend-
ant's awareness of that duty to act or inquire. In other words,
the prosecution must show that the defendant was aware that
his conduct was "unauthorized."'
166
Similarly, commentators have recognized that an exception
to the general principle that ignorance of the law is no defense
occurs "where the statute only covers 'wilful' or 'knowing' fail-
ure to carry out a duty, for there ignorance of the existence or
scope of the duty negates the required mental state .... 167 If
Congress has defined an environmental crime to require a de-
fendant's knowledge both of a legal duty and the facts giving
rise to that legal duty, then Liparota indicates that the prosecu-
tion must show the defendant's awareness of both of these ele-
ments. To the extent that application of principles such as
deliberate ignorance would allow the prosecution to demon-
strate merely that the defendant was negligent or reckless in
failing to ascertain the legal duty or the facts giving rise to that
duty, the prosecution's use of such doctrines is limited by
Liparota.
For similar reasons, a statute which imposes criminal liability
on the basis of a knowing mental state requires more than that
a corporate officer have knowledge of a duty to act or inquire,
attempt to fulfill this duty, and negligently fail to fulfill it either
directly or by a negligent delegation of the responsibility to
165. See Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 425 n.9 (1985).
166. Id.
167. W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTr, supra note 9, § 3.3(b), at 291.
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fulfill it. If a corporate officer delegated or attempted to fulfill
the duty responsibly, exercised an appropriate degree of dili-
gence or oversight, and noncompliance with a statutory provi-
sion or regulation nevertheless occurred, this again appears to
be a circumstance where Congress has specified civil liability
on a strict liability basis. The Liparota Court recognized that
Congress has the ultimate responsibility for defining conduct
that is subject to criminal liability. 168 Where Congress speci-
fies a knowing mental state, an unknowing failure to comply
with the statute or regulation is not criminally culpable behav-
ior.' 69 That the responsible corporate officer doctrine arose
under statutes imposing criminal liability on a strict liability ba-
sis underscores the fact that the negligent standard of conduct
underlying that doctrine is simply inappropriate in an analysis
of criminal provisions that specify a knowing mental state.
70
Just as individual liability under the criminal provisions of
federal environmental statutes is based on a knowing state of
mind undiluted by irrelevant or inappropriate inferential tools,
a corporation's criminal liability under such statutes should be
similarly confined. If individuals within the corporation could
not be held criminally liable under the federal environmental
statutes, because of the inapplicability or inappropriateness of
a deliberate ignorance or responsible corporate officer instruc-
tion, it is illogical to nevertheless impute knowledge of these
individual actors to the corporation on a collective knowledge
theory for purposes of finding the corporation to have know-
ingly violated the statute.' 7 ' Thus, where the prosecution's
theory of a corporation's criminal liability is on the basis of
vicarious liability and the prosecution, for the reasons given
above, is not allowed to infer knowledge on the part of the
individuals through the use of the deliberate ignorance or re-
sponsible corporate officer principles, then for purposes of the
collective knowledge doctrine there is no "knowledge" by indi-
viduals within the corporation that can be imputed to the cor-
poration for purposes of showing a knowing state of mind.
168. Liparota, 471 U.S. at 424, 427.
169. See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
170. See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
171. See generally K. BRICKEY, supra note 40, § 4:05, at 97.
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The type of potentially criminal conduct that is most troub-
lesome, in light of the doctrines discussed in this article, is a
defendant's unknowing failure to perform a required duty or
his failure to recognize that an affirmative duty exists. Cases in
which individuals or corporations are direct actors in breach-
ing an affirmative duty are appropriate cases for application of
the inferential tools discussed previously. Where an omission
or a failure to perform an affirmative duty (to act or to inquire)
is asserted as the basis of criminal liability, congressional direc-
tives in the federal environmental statutes, as well as the
Liparota line of cases, suggest that the government must show
not merely the fact of a defendant's omission, a negligent igno-
rance of the facts, or a responsible corporate position, but in-
stead must show: (1) the statute or regulation creates a duty to
perform an affirmative act; (2) the duty to perform this affirma-
tive act applies to the individual in question; 7 2 (3) that the
duty to act or inquire was in fact violated; and (4) that the de-
fendant knew of the duty and consciously ignored it for the
purpose of avoiding learning the fact of its unlawfulness. Ad-
herence to this formula, as well as judicious use of the criminal
law principles of deliberate ignorance, responsible relation-
ship, and collective knowledge, will ensure that the distinctions
drawn by Congress in federal environmental statutes between
civil and criminal liability remain intact.
172. If the defendant is a corporation and the prosecution will attempt to use the
collective knowledge theory of liability, then the prosecution should have to show the
duty applies to each individual whose knowledge will be imputed to the corporation.
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